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Abstract 
We propose a game theoretical model to assess the capacity of 
Catalonia to become a recognized, independent country with at least 
a de facto European Union (EU) membership. Support for Catalan 
independence is increasing for reasons pertaining to identity and 
economics. Spain can avoid a vote for independence by effectively 
‘buying-out’ a proportion of the Catalan electorate with a funding 
agreement favorable to Catalonia. If, given the current economic 
circumstances, the buying-out strategy is too expensive, a pro-
independence vote is likely to pass. Our model predicts an agreement 
in which Spain and the European Union accommodate Catalan 
independence in exchange for Catalonia taking a share of the Spanish 
debt. If Spain and the EU do not accommodate, Spain becomes 
insolvent, which in turn destabilizes the EU. The current economic 
woes of Spain and the EU both contribute to the desire for Catalan 
independence and make it possible.  
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Introduction 
 
Economically advanced democracies make very stable states and so far no 
secessionist movement has been successful in peacefully breaking away from one of them.
i
 
This fact stands in sharp contrast with Alesina and Spoloare’s theory of state size which holds 
that states should proliferate in a highly globalized international environment where conquest 
is rare.
ii
 This should be particularly true within the European Union (EU), which provides 
security and economies of scale to its members and thus creates the conditions in which 
minority nations have the right incentives to seek independence. Although strong secessionist 
movements exist in the EU (e.g. Scotland, Flanders, the Basque Country), none of them have 
gained sufficient popular support nor had the leverage to obtain recognition from their 
sovereign. That may not be the case anymore for Catalonia. We argue that he recent increase 
in support for independence in Catalonia is based on the dire economic circumstances 
affecting Spain, so keeping the status quo is no longer attractive for the Catalan government 
and a large proportion of the Catalan population.
iii
 We predict that if a pro-independence 
referendum passes, Catalonia will secede from Spain and become, at least, a de-facto member 
of the EU.
iv
 The main deterrent used by the Spanish government is the claim that an 
independent Catalonia would not be internationally recognized and therefore excluded from 
the EU. We demonstrate that this is a non-credible threat.  
There is an expression in Spanish that the choice between two unpleasant options is 
like being stuck between the sword and the wall.
v
 Spain could potentially face such a choice 
over Catalan secession. Using a game theoretical model, we assess the policy options for both 
the Spanish central government (Spain) and the Catalan regional government (Catalonia). 
Spain can stop a referendum by proposing a funding agreement that is sufficiently favorable 
to Catalonia and thus reduce the reasons to call an independence referendum with an 
uncertain outcome. Such an offer may not be an option in the current economic climate and 
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therefore a referendum is most likely to be called. If it passes, Catalonia will need to decide 
on whether to seek a settlement without independence, or take the path to full sovereignty. 
The unequivocal decision to become independent forces a choice upon Spain and the EU: (1) 
To accommodate Catalan independence and accession to the EU if Catalonia accepts a 
percentage of the Spanish national debt; (2) To deny formal recognition to Catalonia but risk 
Spanish insolvency and the economic viability of the Euro.
vi
 Assuming that Catalonia can 
move toward independence in a peaceful manner that Madrid cannot ignore, and assuming 
that the Spanish state does not (or simply cannot) choose to stop the independence movement 
through violence, we show that accommodation becomes the optimal solution for all parties. 
The use of violence is a poor option for Spain. The very essence of the EU is to avoid 
conflict in Europe. In Robert Schuman’s words, the process of European unification started to 
‘make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible.’ This line of thinking was 
formalized in the 1950 Schuman Declaration, the agreement that created the first incarnation 
of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community. Indeed, the use of military force within 
the EU would be hard to justify ethically, and it would further destabilize an already unstable 
economic environment. The export-intensive Catalan economy is heavily integrated into a 
pan-European supply chain.
vii
 Even a low level intervention – e.g. the dismissal and arrest of 
the Catalan government
viii
 – would disrupt that supply chain and generate huge losses in the 
short term. More importantly, such a move would threaten stability and cause an increase in 
the debt risk premiums of Spain and, possibly, other economically imperiled European 
countries. The only way Spain and the EU can pacify the markets in the event of Catalonia 
seeking independence following a successful referendum would be to reach a viable long 
term solution as soon as possible.  
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. We first discuss the dynamics of 
secessionism in advanced democracies. We then provide background on the Catalan case, 
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describing the political and economic landscape. We next develop a 2-player game where the 
resulting solution is negotiated independence, and we discuss the assumptions on which it is 
based. We finish with conclusions and implications. 
 
Secessionism in Advanced Democracies 
There are a number of reasons for why a group of individuals within a country would 
attempt to form an independent state. The most common explanation points to nationalism, 
which according to Gellner, is the belief that the ‘political and the national unit should be 
congruent.’ix But of course, the majority of the world’s nations choose to put aside this belief 
and remain with their current state.
x
 Why some groups shoot for independence when others 
do not is the subject of a wide literature. Many of these explanations focus on economic 
grievances, ethno-national differences, state predation, and state collapse.
xi
 Some theories 
approach secessionism from a decidedly economic perspective, arguing that secessionists 
weigh the advantages of remaining in the larger state against the merits of independence.
xii
 
Other work highlights democracy, and maintains that democratic institutions can provide 
internal groups with political voice and dampen their desire to exit the state.
xiii
 
 Part of the reason for the range of theoretical explanations is the sheer diversity of 
secessionist movements.
xiv
 Many movements have limited visibility and command low levels 
of local support (e.g. Hawaii, Brittany). Some have the tacit approval of their sovereign but 
haven’t worked out internally whether independence is in their best interest (e.g. Puerto Rico, 
Cook Islands). Others fervently desire independence but are systematically denied it by their 
government, often violently (e.g. Kurdistan, Mindanao, Chechnya). But a growing number 
reside in wealthy democracies and possess substantial local support (e.g. Scotland, Flanders). 
For many in this last category, such as Catalonia, violence on the issue appears less likely 
because both sides – the center and the region – seem committed to a democratic and 
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institutional process. This interesting variety of secessionism pits the right of states to 
preserve their territory against the right of nations to self-determine.
xv
 It raises complicated 
ethical questions about the right of individuals and groups to choose their political 
association.
xvi
 And, provided violence remains a non-option, it forces the state to prove to the 
aspiring secessionists why political voice is a better option than political exit. 
Independence efforts almost always cite the norm of self-determination in their 
appeals.
xvii
 But while self-determination is recognized in international law and in the United 
Nations Charter, it does not translate to a right to secession.
xviii
 As Crawford asserts, 
‘secession is neither legal nor illegal in international law, but a legally neutral act the 
consequences of which are internationally regulated.’xix Since the mid-20th century, the 
international community has limited sovereign recognition to cases of decolonization (i.e. 
overseas colonial units), dissolution, and consent. In addition, there is some debate as to 
whether recognition should be given to breakaway regions whose governments are failing to 
supply basic functions and/or violating the human rights of the nation in question.
xx
 Such 
remedial claims to secession are typically found in less developed states where democracy 
and the rule of law is weak or absent.  
Secessionist movements in advanced democracies constitute an interesting subset 
where institutional solutions are preferred, where violence is unlikely, and where the usual 
paths to independence are blocked. There are ample theoretical arguments that predict 
secession in these instances. For example, Alesina and Spoloare argue that state size is 
endogenous to various systemic constraints such as the frequency of war and the robustness 
of the global economy.
xxi
 Large states are generally better at defense because they have more 
land and a bigger population, and they can reap the benefits of having large internal 
economies of scale. In contrast, the attraction of small states is that the locus of decision-
making can be moved closer to one’s own preferences. Thus, when conquest is common and 
6 
 
the global economy is sparse, we ought to see big states. Conversely, when conquest is rare 
and the global economy is robust, we ought to see smaller states that can focus more on 
issues of local preferences rather than national defense and the perils of economic autarky. If 
there was ever an environment that favored small states, surely it is modern Western Europe. 
Secessionists in advances democracies can also invoke an ethical tradition that 
focuses on the right of individuals or groups to choose their political association. These 
Choice (or Primary Rights) theories vary somewhat as to how a group is delimited, the 
process by which its independence should be determined, and whether or not the utility of the 
rump state should be taken into account.
xxii
 Such arguments resonate in places like Catalonia 
and Scotland that are keen to pursue their independence via an institutional and democratic 
process. 
Although some theorists argue that regions should be allowed to exit the state 
following a proper plebiscite, the time when the international community is prepared to 
accommodate such a principle has not yet come. Practices of recognition could of course 
change, especially if a nation is able to secede under these terms and set a precedent – an 
issue we return to in the conclusion. But until then, the best route to independence for regions 
like Catalonia is to win the consent of their sovereign. Doing so requires persuasion, 
legitimate behavior, and, as we argue, careful bargaining.  
 
Catalonia and Secessionism 
Catalonia has a distinctive language spoken by the majority of the population and a 
consistent historical narrative of the Catalan nation including foundational myths in the Early 
Middle Ages.
xxiii
 The relationship between Madrid and Catalonia has long oscillated between 
accommodation and repression. For example, Catalonia was granted a Statute of Autonomy 
(Estatut, in Catalan) during the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936). But when 
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Generalissimo Franco imposed his dictatorship the Estatut was abolished along with most of 
the laws passed by the Republic. These policies were reversed after Franco’s death in 1975, 
and since 1979 Catalonia (along with other regions) has enjoyed relatively high levels of 
local autonomy. Nevertheless, frustration with the existing political relationship and the 
failure to gain increased autonomy from Madrid has energized the independence movement. 
Figure 1: Which kind of political entity should Catalonia be with respect to Spain?  
 
 
Independence aspirations have consistently grown in Catalonia over the last decade. 
As Figure 1 shows, when Catalans are asked about their preferred political relationship with 
respect to Spain, the ‘Independent State’ option has moved from 19.4% to 46.4% over the last 
three years, while the ‘Autonomous Community’ and the ‘Federal State’ options have moved 
from 38.2% and 29.5%, respectively, to 20.7% and 22.4%. In other words, the percentage of 
individuals supporting independence now outnumbers the other two categories combined. If 
we consider the data from the beginning of the series, the number of supporters for an 
Independent state has almost quadrupled in about eight years.
xxiv
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A poll from the Catalan governmental organization on public opinion studies (Centre 
d'Estudis d'Opinió, CEO) asked respondents directly about their intention to vote in a 
hypothetical independence referendum. The last available wave of this study reported that 
55.6% of Catalans would vote ‘Yes’ to independence while 23.4% would vote ‘No’ (CEO, 
2013). These data are listed in Table 1.  
Table 1: Support for Independence in a Hypothetical Referendum 
 Yes No Abstain Other (includes 
Not know and 
No Reply) 
2011 (2) 42.9 28.2 23.3 5.7 
2011 (3) 45.4 24.7 23.8 6.2 
2012 (1) 44.6 24.7 24.2 6.5 
2012 (2) 51.1 21.1 21.1 6.8 
2012 (3) 57.0 20.5 14.3 8.3 
2013 (1) 54.7 20.7 17.0 7.5 
2013 (2) 55.6 23.4 15.3 5.7 
 
If we recalculate these percentages after removing the abstentions, independence would pass 
by at least 65% of the vote. In Table 2 we present the lower bound support for independence 
estimation in a hypothetical referendum. Note that we have been conservative by pooling the 
‘Other’ option from Table 1 with the ‘No’ option.xxv  
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Table 2: Lower Bound Support for Independence in a Hypothetical Referendum 
 
 Yes No Turnout 
2011 (2) 55.9 44.1 76.7 
2011(3) 59.5 40.5 76.2 
2012 (1) 58.8 41.2 75.8 
2012 (2) 64.7 35.3 78.9 
2012 (3) 66.4 33.6 85.7 
2013 (1) 66 34 83 
2013 (2) 65.6 35 84.7 
 
 
 
We argue that the reasons for this increase in the independence vote are both political and 
economic. In the next sections we discuss the political and economic landscape of Catalonia 
and explain why these factors have catalyzed Catalan public opinion.   
 
The Catalan political landscape 
The Catalan political environment has traditionally been understood along two axes: 
the ideological dimension (left-right placement) and the identity dimension (more or less 
prone to independence). Today the 135 seats of the Catalan Parliament are occupied by seven 
different political parties (two of them are coalitions). The first five columns of Table 3 
summarize their placement along the two dimensions mentioned.    
The Catalan political landscape is more diverse ideologically than in terms of identity. 
There are four political parties that could be classified as left or left leaning to different 
degrees (PSC, ERC, ICV and CUP), and there is one party clearly on the right (PP). 
Meanwhile, the CiU coalition is center-right, though the two constituent parties possess 
identity differences. Finally, although originally Ciutadans (C’s) shared many similarities 
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with the PSC, today is a centrist party that has also been quite successful in obtaining 
conservative (PP) votes. Overall, the Catalan Parliament is fairly divided; there are 69 seats 
on the right, 57 seats on the left, and nine unassigned seats belonging to the C’s.  
Table 3: Summary of the Catalan Political Parties 
 
  Notes 
 Ideological 
placement 
Supports 
referendum 
Supports 
independence 
2012 
election 
2013 (2) 
CEO poll 
CiU (coalition) 
CDC (senior) 
Centre-
Right 
Yes Yes 
50 35-37 
UCD (junior) 
Centre-
Right 
(Cristian 
Democrats) 
Yes No 
PSC 
Allied with 
PSOE (main 
opposition 
party in Spain) 
Centre-Left Yes No 20 16 
ERC   Centre-Left Yes Yes 21 38-39 
PP 
In power in 
Spain 
(absolute 
majority) 
Right No No 19 13-14 
ICV (coalition) 
Eco-socialists 
and former 
communist 
(among 
others) 
Left Yes Ambiguous 13 13-14 
C's   Centre No No 9 12 
CUP   Left Yes Yes 3 6 
Supports 
referendum 
  
      
107 
(79%) 
109-110  
(81-82%) 
Supports 
independence 
  
      
74-87 
(55-
64%) 
79-96  
(59-71%) 
TOTAL         135   
 
The political landscape is more complicated once we include the identity dimension. 
In the political discourse there are two key questions: (1) Should a referendum on 
independence be held? (2) And if the referendum is held, will the party support voting for 
independence? In regard to the first question, all the parties but two (PP and C’s) support the 
referendum. Thus, 107 out of 135 seats support the holding of a referendum. Those figures 
change when considering what the parties would if a referendum passes. Three parties would 
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campaign against independence (PSC, PP and C’s), two would campaign for independence 
(ERC and CUP), and the ICV position is ambiguous. However, the biggest party, CiU, is split 
on this issue; the most powerful part of the coalition, CDC, would promote independence, 
and UDC would be opposed. Since the position of some parties still need to be clarified, the 
support range for independence would be 74-87 out of 135. In other words, while almost 80% 
of the political parties in Catalonia support the referendum, support for independence is lower 
at between 55-64%. But what is also important to note is the match between the public 
opinion figures and the representation of the political parties in the Parliament.  
 
The Catalan economic landscape 
Support for Catalan independence is also rooted in economic circumstances. An 
important proportion of the population believes that their standard of living would be 
improved if Catalonia was an independent state that controlled its own finances. The above 
mentioned poll asked about the main reason to support independence, and the most cited 
reason was economic in nature: 29.4% of respondents referenced the ‘capacity and desire of 
economic self-management.’xxvi In fact, the national funding model has been one of the most 
important sources of disagreement in the devolution negotiations with the Spanish central 
government. Critically, the Catalan regional government depends on the taxes collected and 
distributed by the central government. Depending on the way it is measured, the structural 
fiscal flow (or fiscal deficit) – the difference between the taxes collected in Catalonia and the 
funds spent in the region corrected by the economic cycle – accounts for about 5-8.5% of the 
Catalan GDP.
xxvii
 This is one of the highest fiscal deficits in the developed world.
xxviii
 
Subsequent changes to the funding model have been negotiated by the Catalan government 
and then applied to the other Spanish regions, but in the end the Catalan deficit has held 
constant.
xxix
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The consequence of this deficit is the public perception that Catalan public hospitals, 
schools, and public services in general would be improved if the financial model were 
corrected. Moreover, unemployment benefits and other transfers have a much lower 
purchasing power in Catalonia than in other, poorer regions of Spain due to significant 
differences in the cost of living.
xxx
 Of course, it is the lower classes that have the most to lose 
from a weak welfare system. But importantly, in Catalonia a lower socio-economic status is 
correlated with a Spanish speaking background.
xxxi
 So, it could be rational for those with a 
non-Catalan background to support independence purely for economic reasons.
xxxii
  
Although it remains an economic powerhouse of Spain, generating about 20% of the 
GDP with 16% of the population, the Catalan economy has not been growing as fast as other 
regions in recent decades.
xxxiii
 More importantly, the global financial crisis as a whole has 
harshly affected Spain and Catalonia. For many Catalans, Spain is not seen as a ‘good 
business’ anymore. Banks have failed, unemployment and public debt have soared, GDP has 
shrunk, and the housing bubble has been deflating for the last few years. Additionally, there 
is an institutional crisis in which corruption scandals has affected most political parties, 
institutions, and the Crown. There are no signs of recovery in the near future and a general 
pessimism persists.
xxxiv
 Although the Catalan political climate is bad, Catalans still feel it is 
better than in the rest of Spain: while 72.4% of the Catalans think that their political situation 
is bad or very bad, this figure rises to 97.1% when they are questioned about the Spanish 
political situation.  
In sum, Catalan secessionism has gained momentum in recent years partly on account 
of economic and political problems. We argue that the current economic crisis also presents 
Catalonia with an opportunity. 
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A Path to Independence 
In the previous sections we discussed the key factors in the current push for Catalan 
independence. First, there is increasing support in the polls for an independent state, making a 
referendum likely but uncertain to pass. Second, this increasing support is based on economic 
factors, so Spain can attempt to stop the independence process by offering a better funding 
model to Catalonia. If Spain does (or cannot) make such an offer, a referendum is likely to 
occur. In that event, strong support for independence would put Spain in a difficult position 
between the sword and the wall. 
We model the strategic interaction of Spain and Catalonia using a simple sequential 
game (see Figure 2). The game starts before a referendum is called by Catalonia.
xxxv
 At this 
stage Spain chooses to make an offer to Catalonia between CSQ, the status quo payoff, and 
CMAX, the best offer Spain can afford. Then Catalonia will either accept or reject the offer. If 
they accept, the referendum is cancelled and the game ends. If the offer is rejected Catalonia 
runs a referendum that passes with probability p.
xxxvi
 Status quo payoffs, in monetary terms, 
are realized if the referendum does not pass. If the referendum passes Catalonia can choose to 
seek a settlement or seek independence.  If Catalonia chooses to seek independence Spain 
then decides whether or not to accommodate. 
The game is played by Spain (the Spanish government) and Catalonia (the Catalan 
government). For simplicity we assume that both players are rational, risk neutral, well-
informed of the potential payoffs, and aware of the probability that an independence 
referendum would pass.
xxxvii
 Players seek to maximize their own payoff, which reflects the 
true outcome, not only the monetary component of an outcome. For instance, Catalonia 
considers the intrinsic value of independence in CA, not only its monetary value. 
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Figure 2: Model of Strategic Interaction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that the payoffs related to Accept, Seek Settlement, Accommodate and even No 
Accommodate could well be the result of a bargaining situation implying several offers and 
Catalonia 
CX 
Spain 
(SNA,CNA ) (SA,CA) 
Accommodate No Accommodate 
Spain (and the EU) 
Seek Independence 
(SS,CS) 
Seek Settlement 
Catalonia 
Referendum 
1-p 
(SNP, CNP) 
(SX, CX) 
CSQ CMAX 
Accept Reject 
p 
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counter offers that are not modeled. For instance, Accept would be the result of a complicated 
negotiation that ends when Spain makes their best and last offer, with Catalonia then deciding 
whether to carry on with the referendum. Accommodate would be the result of a complicated, 
but necessarily swift, three way negotiation between Spain, the EU, and Catalonia. The EU is 
not a player in our model. It can be argued that in the short term there is no economic effect 
for the EU as a whole if Spain decides to accommodate Catalan independence. It is just 
business as usual. On the other hand No Accommodate poses a threat to the very existence of 
the EU. Therefore it is a dominant strategy for the EU to facilitate an accommodation. 
Catalonia inherits a share of the Spanish debt in Accommodate in exchange for EU 
recognition and, at least, de facto EU membership. Once again the details of the bargaining 
process (precise asset and debt sharing, exact temporary fit of Catalonia in the EU 
framework) are not in the model, just the end result. 
No Accommodate is the worst possible outcome for the two players. It implies no debt 
sharing and no recognition of Catalan independence. Two scenarios can be contemplated. In 
the first, Spain might attempt to control the situation by suspending Catalan autonomy and 
assuming control of the regional government. Such a move would generate tremendous 
pressure on the debt markets, as it would be unclear whether the situation is sustainable in the 
long term. The related problems of economic contagion would threaten the EU, and this 
would place added pressure on Spain. In the second scenario, Catalonia would remain in 
control. Here, Spain would not be able to collect taxes in Catalonia and thus the Spanish debt 
to GDP ratio would increase by about 20 percentage points and the tax base would decrease 
by a similar amount. In this scenario Spain bankrupts, seriously endangering the Euro and the 
EU.  
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Given these considerations the payoffs are ranked as follows: 
Spain: SNP ≥ SSQ ≥ SX ≥ SMAX ≥ SS > SA > SNA 
Catalonia: CA > CMAX ≥ CS ≥ CX ≥ CSQ > CNP > CNA 
Most inequalities are straightforward from our previous discussion. Note that for Catalonia 
the status quo is only better than non recognized independence and the payoff associated with 
the referendum not passing, CNP.
xxxviii
 The economic consequences of that outcome would be 
similar to the status quo, but the Catalan society would be fractured by a negative result.  
 A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the game can be found by 
backwards induction. If the last node is reached Spain chooses Accommodate. Therefore 
Catalonia chooses Seek independence if the previous node is reached. Note that (Seek 
Settlement, No Accommodate) is also a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the corresponding 
subgame, but it entails a non-credible threat and therefore is not in the SPNE equilibrium 
path.
xxxix
 Catalonia chooses Accept if CX > (1 – p) CNP + p CA. Finally, Spain calculates the 
smallest CX such that Catalonia Accepts,    
              . If   
  is affordable, that is 
  
      , then      
 , otherwise CX = CSQ.
xl
 This condition imposes a lower bound on p 
for Catalonia to run the referendum p = 
      
      
. That is, once the Spanish offer is known, 
Catalonia chooses Reject if p > p. Note that Catalonia can still Accept even if CX = CSQ, if the 
probability of the referendum passing is sufficiently low, that is p < 
       
      
 = p. Our model 
is consistent with recent history. When the polls indicated little support for independence the 
possibility of a referendum was rarely discussed. Once the economic situation of Spain 
deteriorated, CSQ decreased, affecting the threshold probability p. The decrease of CSQ also 
affects CNP, as CSQ is the monetary component of CNP. Therefore a decrease of CSQ has an 
effect on p, which is indicated by the most recent polls.  
In summary, our model predicts either an offer from Spain that is high enough to stop 
a Catalan referendum for independence or, if such an offer is not affordable, a referendum 
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that, once passing, would lead to independence accommodated by Spain and the EU. Un-
accommodated independence entails a non-credible threat and therefore is not on the 
equilibrium path. 
 
Peaceful Coercion and Non-Violence 
Special attention needs to be paid to the meaning of the strategy Seek Independence. 
This choice needs to be both credible and something that Spain cannot ignore. We argue that 
here Catalonia needs to do more than simply demand that Spain recognizes them – a demand 
that Spain may simply ignore if the results are deemed costless. Instead, the Catalan 
leadership needs to proceed with a strategy of peaceful coercion, which includes several 
elements. First, Catalonia will need to make a formal declaration of independence in the eyes 
of the world.
xli
 Second, it should make a public statement that the transition to sovereignty 
will be conducted in a peaceful manner.  
Third, Catalonia should take an active role in assuming the functions of a sovereign 
state. That is, it should clearly and publicly state the schedule for establishing the additional 
structures of the state. There are many such functions,
xlii
 but for present purposes we 
emphasize taxation. The ability to collect taxes is one of the defining features of the 
sovereign state. We contend that Catalonia should proceed in a clear and public manner to 
dismantle tax obligations to Madrid and transform the Catalan tax apparatus from an 
autonomous region to that of a sovereign state. Of course, these actions would violate 
Spanish law. Under the 1978 Constitution, Spain could choose to dismantle Catalan 
autonomy and incarcerate its government and most of the regional MPs. But such a move 
would be viewed by many as illegitimate after a clear majority had decided to support 
independence. Most importantly, it would force Spain to respond. 
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Overall, Catalonia needs to coerce a response out of Spain and the EU. We maintain 
that clear and public statements regarding sovereignty and the schedule for establishing it are 
moves that cannot be ignored. The current economic environment in Spain and the EU are a 
central component of our argument, one that provides Catalonia with considerable leverage. 
If it proceeds toward independence in the right manner, and the use of force is a non-option, 
then the outcome becomes binary: (1) Spain accommodates and recognizes Catalan 
independence; (2) Spain does not accommodate and Catalonia becomes an unrecognized 
state. 
 
The Assumption of Non-Violence 
Abraham Lincoln famously stated that the Confederacy’s declaration of independence 
had forced the country to choose between dissolution and blood.
xliii
 He was probably not the 
first leader to frame the issue in that manner and he certainly wasn’t the last. Secessionist 
demands are a frequent source of conflict in the world, implicated in roughly half the civil 
wars since 1945.
xliv
 Nevertheless, we assume in our paper that the Spanish state will not use 
violence to deny Catalan independence, provided the secessionists deliberately and publicly 
choose non-violent methods in pursuit of their goal. 
 There are two reasons for our assumption of non-violence. The first centers on the 
logic of consequences. If a clear majority of Catalans vote for independence and the Catalan 
government proceeds in a legitimate and non-violent manner, the Spanish state will suffer 
costs once it decides to stop that secession with military force. At that point the Catalan 
secessionists would be more committed, and Madrid’s use of force could easily create a 
violent backlash. Although the scale of the resulting turmoil is hard to predict, it is certain 
that the resort to violence would threaten the economies of Spain and, for the reasons already 
mentioned, the EU. Arguments relating financial interdependence to conflict are particularly 
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salient here.
xlv
 Even the increased probability of conflict in the northeast of Spain would 
frighten investors and exacerbate the existing bank crisis. Although we believe that this factor 
alone raises the cost of fighting above that of accommodation, we do not include this third 
option in our model for normative reasons that we now turn to. 
 The second and more important reason focuses on the logic of appropriateness. The 
use of violence by the state to deny independence to secessionists using peaceful methods is 
simply considered inappropriate in Spain and much of EU. The avoidance of war is after all 
one of the original purposes behind the EU. It is taken as an accepted wisdom among 
Catalans and other Spaniards that the state would not resort to violence in the face of non-
violent and democratic tactics. We believe that illegitimacy of violence can be thought of as a 
social fact: ‘facts that are produced by virtue of all the relevant actors agreeing that they 
exist.’xlvi If all of the relevant actors consider violence to be inappropriate, then it ceases to be 
option. 
 In making this argument we deliberately invoke the literature on norms. We argue that 
there has been normative change with respect to civil war in Spain and many other countries, 
especially in Western Europe. Despite – or on account – of the fact that some Spaniards can 
actually remember the Civil War of the 1930s, as well as the repressive regime under 
Francisco Franco, norms against illegitimate violence have become internalized. As 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue, norm internalization occurs when it is taken for granted, and 
when the choice of whether or not to abide the norm ceases to be a consideration.
xlvii
 We 
believe that the Spanish state is as unlikely to use violence on the Catalan issue as the United 
Kingdom is over Scotland. David Cameron and Mariano Rajoy cannot persuade their people 
to choose blood, as Lincoln once did. And more importantly, neither man would take that 
option seriously. 
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Conclusion 
We have argued that the current financial situation in Spain and the EU provides 
Catalonia with an opportunity. If Catalonia attempts to secede after a pro-independence 
referendum or referendum, and does so in a legitimate and peaceful manner, Spain will be 
left with two choices: (1) To negotiate Catalan independence and accession to the E.U. if 
Catalonia accepts a percentage of the national debt; (2) To deny formal recognition to 
Catalonia but risk Spanish insolvency and the economic viability of the Euro. We argue that 
the second option is far worse for all parties and, as a result, Spain will be forced to 
accommodate Catalan independence. To avoid this choice between the sword and the wall, 
Spain may be able offer a deal to Catalonia that effectively buys off a portion of the 
population and prevents a referendum from occurring. But Spain may not be able to afford 
such an offer in the current economic environment. The current economic woes of Spain 
contribute to the desire for Catalan independence and make it possible. 
Rather than argue that this outcome will occur, or even that it should occur, we prefer 
to draw attention to the fact that it can occur. Catalonia represents a particular breed of 
secessionist movement, one that may well become more common in the future. Unlike the 
violent secessionist struggles in Myanmar or Yemen, secessionism in Catalonia has been 
negotiated in a remarkably peaceful and institutional manner. This seems to be the hallmark 
of secessionism in advanced democracies. Rather than resort to force, the state has to 
persuade the break-away region that their interests are better served by staying together. Of 
course, sovereign states do have other weapons at their disposal, and one of the most potent is 
their ability to block international recognition of the seceding region.
xlviii
 But this is all part of 
the bargaining environment in which aspiring nations have to negotiate with their sovereign. 
For Catalonia, the current economic crisis has created a situation in which the home state veto 
may be too costly for Madrid. 
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Some may lament the fact that violence is essentially a non-option in Catalonia and 
Scotland. They may point out, as Lincoln did, that the recursive nature of secessionism 
imperils states and therefore validates the choice of blood. But we argue that the rejection of 
violence in modern democracies forces governments to use the political process to balance 
the interests of center and periphery. Current polls suggest that the center should win the 
contest if Scotland follows through on its independence referendum in 2014. Such an 
outcome would be a testament to the government’s ability to persuade Scotts why they should 
remain in the United Kingdom. That same outcome may occur in Catalonia if a referendum is 
held. 
It is, however, interesting to speculate on the international consequences of the 
opposite outcome: Catalonia votes for independence and obtains sovereignty in accordance 
with our model. That event would set a precedent for secessionist movements in advanced 
democracies and constitute a victory for the advocates of Choice Theory.
xlix
 True, few break-
away regions will possess the same leverage over their sovereign, but Catalan independence 
would likely change the international playing field. After all, the international recognition 
regime is hardly static
l
, and it may one day come to accept democratic secessions even in the 
absence of sovereign consent. Thus, Catalan independence could incite similar groups to 
reach for the same end, especially within the EU, and help shape the rights and principles 
regarding the sovereign recognition of states. 
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i
 In making this claim we exclude cases of decolonization. 
ii
 Alesina and Spoloare 1997. 
iii
 For variation in voter turnout across municipalities, see Munoz and Guinjoan 2013. 
iv
 By de facto we mean that Catalonia’s present economic relationship to the EU will continue. Formal 
membership as a sovereign state would follow. 
v
 Translated: Entre la espada y la pared. 
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vi
 The debt to GDP ratio of Spain would increase by about 20% if an unrecognized independent Catalonia does 
not take over a share of the Spanish debt. In the current economic circumstances, Spain, an economy too large to 
fail, would most likely bankrupt, critically destabilizing both the Euro zone and the EU. 
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xxiv
 Comparing the official survey data gathered by the Spanish governmental organization, Centro de 
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xxv
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xxvi
 The other responses are: 18.8% state that ‘Catalonia would improve’; 14.7% say a ‘feeling of 
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